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When Private Goes Public: Legal
Protection for Women Who Breastfeed
in Public and at Work
Danielle M. Shelton*
I was shocked and appalled to read that it is not only per-
missible for women to breastfeed in public in the State of New
York, but now also punishable as a crime for anyone interfering
in this act.
Breasts in public view, thong bathing suits with buttocks
in full view; what's next, unisex washrooms? Or will it be OK to
pull off the shoulder of a major highway and urinate in public
view too? To me, this is just another sad example of the declin-
ing decency and public morality in America.'
The promotion of family values and infant health demand
putting an end to the vicious cycle of embarrassment and igno-
rance that constricts women and men alike in the subject of
breast feeding and represents hostility to mothers and babies in
our culture based on archaic and outdated moral taboos. Any
genuine promotion of family values should encourage public ac-
ceptance of this most basic act of nurture between mother and
baby, and no mother should be made to feel incriminated or so-
cially ostracized for breast feeding her baby.2
Unfortunately for many breastfeeding women, the first opin-
ion expressed above is all too common and the latter all too rare.
Breastfeeding is perceived by many as dirty, sexual, embarrassing,
and generally something that should be kept behind closed doors.
It is something about which women should be cautious and
* Law Clerk to the Honorable Ed Carnes, Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals.
B.A., Augustana College, summa cur laude; J.D., Harvard University, magna cum
laude. I began this article as a course paper for Professor Martha Field's Reproduc-
tive Rights Seminar. My sincere thanks to the seminar participants and other
friends and family members too numerous to mention specifically.
1. Robert F. Holas, Declining Decency, Ci. TRm., May 29, 1994, at C2 (letter to
the editor).
2. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAw § 79-e (Consol. 1994) (Legislative Findings). The New
York legislature went on to find that "the breast feeding of a baby is an important
and basic act of nature which must be encouraged in the interests of maternal and
child health and family values." Id.
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ashamed. But such has not always been the case, and it need not
continue.
When talking with my great-grandmother, she seemed sur-
prised that breastfeeding is controversial at all, let alone an issue
with legal implications. She recalled the days of her childhood
when women would unbutton their blouses and breastfeed their ba-
bies during church. No one thought much about it. Breastfeeding
was like burping a baby-just something a person did, whether in
public or private. My great-grandmother is not alone in her sur-
prise that breastfeeding raises legal issues. Upon learning that I
was writing this article, a fellow lawyer gave me a puzzled look and
then asked, quite sincerely, what breastfeeding has to do with the
law.
While many people may be unaware of the legal issues sur-
rounding breastfeeding, most breastfeeding women are not. At the
recent United Nations Conference on Women, delegates from
around the world said that "restrictive work arrangements, social
stigma and false information are denying Jwomen) a choice in how
to feed their babies."3 Breastfeeding women wonder whether they
will be harassed, evicted, or even arrested for feeding their babies
in public. Moreover, employed breastfeeding women worry about
whether and how they can breastfeed or breastpump 4 at work.
Although the legal issues facing breastfeeding women are not alto-
gether new, they are increasingly important as more women at-
tempt to breastfeed in public and at work.5 Statistics compiled by
the United States Bureau of Labor statistics show that over 50% of
mothers with children under the age of three are working outside
the home.6 Among mothers who work full-time, more than half be-
gin breastfeeding their newborns in the hospital, yet only 12.5% are
still nursing five to six months later compared to 22.7% of non-
working mothers.7 When breastfeeding women leave their homes
and attempt to integrate breastfeeding into their public and profes-
sional lives, they face barriers to breastfeeding that require legal
protection.
3. Marcus Eliason, Rain Muddies Women's Gathering, MoNTGOMERY ADVER-
TISER, Sept. 2, 1995, at 11A.
4. "Breastpumping" is the term used to describe the manual or mechanical ex-
pression of milk from a woman's breast into a container. The milk usually is stored
and later fed to the baby from a bottle.
5. Telephone Interview with Mary Lofton, La Leche League International (Mar.
15, 1994).
6. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, HANDBOOK OF LABOR
STATISTICS 241 (1989).
7. Pamela Mendels, Lunch Time for Breast-Fed Babies, NEwSDAY, June 5, 1994
at A74 (citing statistics reported by Ross Laboratories).
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This article examines the discrimination against breastfeed-
ing in public and at work and discusses actual and potential legisla-
tive and judicial responses. This article urges that citizens,
legislatures, and courts gain greater awareness of the barriers that
breastfeeding women face and work to eliminate these barriers.
Part I discusses the various types of discrimination against
breastfeeding that women regularly encounter in public and at
work. Part II discusses recent state laws addressing public
breastfeeding and other potential sources for relief under state law.
Part III discusses federal support for the right to breastfeed, includ-
ing the Fourteenth Amendment, and Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimina-
tion Act (PDA). Finally, the article concludes that the lack of clear
protection for the right to breastfeed under both state and federal
law leaves many women vulnerable to continued harassment and
discrimination. Until a clear and feasible policy protecting
breastfeeding and breastpumping is established, many women may
be forced to choose unnecessarily between their jobs, their public
lives, and the well-being of their children.
I. Discrimination Against Breastfeeding
Discrimination against breastfeeding is a reality that shapes
the daily lives of many women and requires them to make difficult
choices about their own well-being as well as that of their children.
It seems no breastfeeding woman is immune from potential attacks
by employers, police officers, quasi-public property owners, other
citizens, and security guards. As plentiful as the incidents of dis-
crimination are the reasons behind the hostility to breastfeeding.
Indeed, part of the difficulty in addressing this problem is simply
determining its source.
A Discrimination Illustrated
Examples of discrimination against breastfeeding women
abound. In Florida, a security guard instructed a woman to leave a
shopping mall because she breastfed her infant in the food court.8
Similarly, the manager informed a diner at the upscale Beverly Ro-
deo Hotel that she could not nurse her son in the dining area.9 An-
8. Barri Bronston, The Feeding Frenzy: Nursing Mothers Struggle to Feed Their
Babies in Public, Despite Frequent Disapproval, NEW ORLEANs TIMES-PCAYUNE,
June 27, 1994, at D1.
9. Christine A. Littleton, Restructuring Sexual Equality, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1279,
1310 (1987) (discussing Kaufmaa v. Beverly Rodeo Hotel, No. C494133 (Cal. Super.
Ct. Santa Monica, filed Apr. 12, 1984)). Littleton imagines a dialogue between the
woman and the manager in which the woman asks for "equality" and the manager
1995]
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other woman was "banished from" a public swimming pool because
she refused to stay in the locker room while breastfeeding.10
Discrimination against breastfeeding or breastpumping in the
workplace takes a similar form." An attorney with a mid-sized
Manhattan law firm, who pumped breastmilk for her infant several
times a day in her office, was called into a senior partner's office and
told to wean her child. He said at her billing rate the breastmilk
cost about $10 an ounce and the law firm could not afford it.12 In
the public sector, a United States postal employee was prohibited
from pumping breastmilk during her breaks in the first aid room.
She was told that it was not the policy of the post office "to allow
federal facilities to be used for draining breast milk."i 3
Such instances of discrimination against breastfeeding have
far-reaching and socially detrimental effects. Working women who
might otherwise choose to breastfeed their children may choose not
to do so, fearing intolerance or simply embarrassment.i 4 Some wo-
replies, "Yes, let's have equality. We don't allow men to bare their breasts in the
dining room, so we can't let you do it either." The dialogue continues, with each
exchange revealing a new, yet equally frustrating, rationalization for the manager's
sex discrimination.
10. Elizabeth N. Baldwin & Kenneth A. Friedman, Breastfeeding Legislation in
the United States, NEW BEGINNINGS, Nov.-Dec. 1994, at 164. In fact, the city went on
to enact an ordinance forbidding breastfeeding at the pool. Id.
11. Although this article focuses on discrimination against breastfeeding and
theories of legal protection, it is worth noting that some employers have developed
"infant nursing areas" in their workplaces. The areas allow breastfeeding mothers to
breastpump or nurse their babies during breaks. The list of employers who have
developed nursing areas includes AT&T, Texas Instruments, New York Life Insur-
ance Company, and Goldman Sachs & Company. See Pamela Mendels, Making
Moms Feel At Home: Employers Find Breast-feeding Rooms Are Good Business, DA-
LAS MORNING NEWS, June 24, 1994, at 1C.
12. Kathleen Sylvester, How Firms Cope With Motherhood: Examining the Op-
tions, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 7, 1983, at 1, 28. One suspects that the attorney, not the firm,
was paying the price of breastpumping through longer work hours.
13. Judy Mann, Nursing Mother's Story Has Yet Another Chapter, WASH. POST,
July 9, 1980, at C1. Fortunately, the woman's neighbor knew someone at the postal
service and discovered that no such policy existed. Id. The woman then was allowed
to use the first aid station. A media relations officer for the postal service explained,
"It was a problem about understanding this was not going to go on forever, that it
was something that would be a convenience for a certain amount of time." Id.
14. There are numerous reports of difficulty and embarrassment surrounding at-
tempts to find a place to breastpump at work. See, e.g., Mendels, supra note 7 (re-
porting that a legal secretary considered weaning her son because "continued
nursing meant embarrassing visits to the ladies room." Her new employer provided
a special nursing area at work, however, allowing her to continue breastfeeding.);
Shelley D. Coolidge, Sanuita Program Promotes Breast-Feeding by Mothers, CmIs-
Tar Sci. MONITOR, Mar. 1, 1994, at 9 ("Many women stop breast-feeding after they
return to work ... Others continue, but never inform their supervisors for fear of
being reprimanded or fired."); Patrice Wendling, Nursing Mothers Go Corporate,
CAPrrAL TudMs, Sept. 7, 1995, at 3F ("I began to think about the newsroom's own
women's restroom, located within earshot of the generally all-male city desk and
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men may feel pressured to leave their jobs in order to raise their
children in the manner they desire. Similarly, many children may
be denied the benefits of breastmilk.15 Further, many valuable fe-
male employees will struggle unnecessarily in attempting to
breastfeed or breastpump in a hostile workplace.
One need only look to Norway, where women are allowed two
hours daily to breastfeed at work, to observe the positive impact
that employer cooperation has on breastfeeding rates. Ninety-nine
percent of mothers are still breastfeeding after six weeks, in con-
trast to only forty percent in England and twelve percent in North-
ern Ireland, where no such policies are in place.16 Despite
widespread agreement among medical professionals that
breastfeeding, when possible, is the best form of nutrition for in-
fants, the rate of breastfeeding in this country is low. Only fifty-five
percent of new mothers nationwide ever try breastfeeding. Only
twenty percent breastfeed for six months.17 Undoubtedly the fail-
ure to support and accommodate this vital process in public and the
workplace contributes to the problem.
B. Sources of Intolerance
The reasons for discrimination against breastfeeding are quite
varied. One argument against breastfeeding at work, and particu-
larly in public, is that breasts and breastfeeding are inherently sex-
ual. As one breastfeeding advocate noted, "Our society is far more
at home with the idea of sexy breasts than functional ones."' 8
Similar to the criticism that public breastfeeding is "sexual" is
the complaint that breastfeeding is "embarrassing, unnecessary,
without a stitch of privacy or even a bench to sit on. And how those mustard yellow
walls and stark bathroom stalls looked less than inviting on my first day back to
work as a breast-feeding mom/reporter.").
15. See infra notes 29-36 and accompanying text (discussing the health benefits
of breastfeeding to both mother and child).
16. Judy Jones, Formula To Take Babies Off Breast, OBSERVER (London), Apr. 9,
1995, at 9; Dinah Hall, The Campaign for Real Milk, INDEPENDENT (London), May
15, 1994, at 60.
17. Ross Laboratories, Ross Mothers Survey: Breast-Feeding Rates Increase for
Fourth Consecutive Year (June 1995) (unpublished press release, on file with the
Law and Inequality Journal).
18. Reena N. Glazer, Women's Body Image and the Law, 43 DUKE L.J. 113, 138
n.151 (1993) (quoting trial transcript from a case involving women who publicly ex-
posed their breasts in secluded area of park in protest of state law which criminal-
izes women, but not men, exposing their chests in public). The letter to the editor
excerpted at the beginning of this article exemplifies this notion-the writer cited
public breastfeeding as "another sad example of the declining decency and public
morality in America." Holas, supra note 1, at C2.
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disgusting, a form of exhibitionism or attention-seeking."19 An at-
torney with whom I worked seemed embarrassed to learn I had
been pumping breastmilk when he tried to walk into my locked of-
fice. Red-faced, he told me he was sorry and that we should forget it
ever happened.
A significant amount of hostility toward public breastfeeding
stems from the belief that breastfeeding is trivial and mundane.
Rather than viewing breastfeeding as a symbol of our country's
moral downfall, some think it is simply unimportant and not wor-
thy of legal protection. Unfortunately, many of those with the abil-
ity to shape policies and influence change-employers, judges,
security guards, restaurant owners, and voters-hold this view.
For example, one law review author described as "frivolous" a wo-
man's lawsuit against a city that had prevented her from
breastfeeding by a public wading pool. 2o The author compared the
lawsuit to one in which a man sued the devil for causing his down-
fall and to another in which a prisoner sued a sheriff for letting him
escape.2 1 Similarly, a federal district judge dismissed as "frivolous"
a public teacher's claim regarding the right to breastfeed over her
lunch hour and awarded the other side attorneys' fees.22 In an-
other situation, a newspaper editorial criticized the state legisla-
ture for considering a pro-breastfeeding statute and suggested
moving on to more "pressing topics."2 3
Breastfeeding is not trivial. It involves an intricate process of
supply and demand which necessitates breastfeeding or pumping at
regular intervals. Breastmilk is produced and maintained by the
baby's nursing, which sends a signal to the mother's brain to in-
crease the milk supply.24 Not surprisingly, the physical ties of
breastfeeding also cultivate strong psychological bonds between
mother and child.25 In addition, breastmilk is widely recognized as
19. Peter Pallot, Breastfeeding Women Are Told To Leave, DAILy TELEGRAPH
(London), Nov. 6, 1993, at 6.
20. Anne Proffitt Dupre, Note, Yost v. Torok and Abusive Litigation: A New Tort
To Solve an Old Problem, 21 GA. L. REv. 429, 430-31 n.7 (1986).
21. Id.
22. Dike v. School Bd., 650 F.2d 783, 783 (5th Cir. 1981). The case was reversed
and remanded on appeal. See infra Part III.A.
23. Breast-Feeding Mothers: Don't Complicate Matters, VmGiNiAN-Pmor, Feb. 13,
1994, at C4.
24. DIANE MASON & DLANE INGERSOLL, BREASTFEEDING AND THE WORKING
MOTHER 25 (1986).
25. Some pro-breastfeeding advocates take on an almost religious zealousness.
One pro-breastfeeding group member said that she thinks everyone should
breastfeed if they physically can and another woman said that when she sees a wo-
man bottle feeding her baby she thinks she and that woman "don't have as much in
common." 20/20: The Pressure to Breastfeed (ABC television broadcast, Mar. 20,
1995).
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the ideal food for infants.2 6 It provides complete nutrition until the
baby is six months old, helps the infant's health by reducing the
chances of contracting ear and respiratory infections, and reduces
the child's allergic tendencies. 27 Studies also show that breastfeed-
ing may reduce a mother's chances of developing breast cancer and
help her return to her pre-pregnancy shape.28
In fact, the benefits of breastfeeding for both mother and child
have prompted various government agencies to sponsor programs
encouraging new mothers to breastfeed.29 For example, the
Breastfeeding Promotion Consortium, formed by the United States
Department of Agriculture (the USDA) and the American Academy
of Pediatrics, meets twice yearly to discuss methods of promoting
breastfeeding.30 In 1989, a federal act allotted $8 million to state
Supplemental Food Programs for Women, Infants, and Children
(commonly referred to as WIC programs) to spend on the promotion
ofbreastfeeding.31 The USDA, which administers WIC, stated that
its promotion of breastfeeding is not simply to save money other-
wise spent on infant formula; rather, the USDA believes breastfeed-
ing provides significant health benefits to infants.32
The health benefits of breastfeeding are also widely recognized
in other countries, where various pro-breastfeeding measures have
been taken. In the past year, both Britain and China have issued
regulations severely limiting advertising by infant formula compa-
nies.33 The countries hope that absent such advertising new
mothers will look to the breast before the bottle. In Canada, the
government is promoting breastfeeding through a $450,000 na-
tional advertising campaign. 34 The campaign's main television
advertisement shows a woman breastfeeding her baby at a mall
26. Nancy B. Brent et al., Breast-feeding In a Low-Income Population: Program
to Increase Incidence and Duration, 149 ARCHIVES PEDIATRICS & ADOLESCENT MED.,
798, 798 (1995); Mark Momjian, Winning the Weaning War: Breastfeeding as a Fac-
tor In Child Custody Litigation, 8 AM. J. FAm. L. 135, 135 (1994).
27. Terry Gilbert, The Case for Breastfeeding: Proponent Says Women Denied
Empowerment, CALGARY HERALID, Nov. 29, 1991, at D6.
28. PA. Newcomb, Lactation and a Reduced Risk of Premenopausal Breast Can-
cer, 330 N. ENG. J. MED. 81 (1994).
29. See, e.g., Testimony of William Ludwig, Administrator, Department of Agri-
culture, before Senate Appropriations Committee, FDCH Congressional Testimony,
May 10, 1995; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 383.011 (West 1993).
30. Virginia Bearder, WIC: America's Best Kept Secret, SPECIAL DELIVERY, Dec.
22, 1994, at 4.
31. Id. (referring to the Child Nutrition and WIC Reauthorization Act).
32. Id.
3B. Hail, supra note l6, at 60; China Bans Ads for Infant Formuia, Pmoaw
GAZETTE, July 4, 1995, at A10.
34. Laurie Monsebraaten, Ads To Promote Breast-Feeding, TORONTO STAR, Sept.
10, 1994, at D8.
1995]
Law and Inequality
and asks, "What's wrong with this picture?" The text replies,
"Nothing."35 According to a Canadian government spokesperson,
the health benefits of increased breastfeeding will greatly outweigh
the campaign costs.36
Besides the criticisms of breastfeeding as both sexual and triv-
ial-a peculiar combination-both breastfeeding and babies are
viewed as unprofessional. Babies simply do not fit the professional
image. As such, the workplace is neither inclined nor equipped to
meet the needs of breastfeeding and breastpumping employees.
Thus, an employer may be hostile to the breastfeeding employee's
need for more flexible and frequent breaks as well as a private area
to nurse or pump breastmilk. 3 7
11. State Legislative Protection for Breastfeeding
Fortunately, growing public awareness of discrimination
against breastfeeding has resulted in more options for women seek-
ing relief in state courts. A few states have enacted statutes that
explicitly address and protect breastfeeding. Although most states
have not yet taken this step, prevalent state anti-discrimination
laws provide another potential source of legal protection for
breastfeeding women.
A. Express Statutory Protection for Breastfeeding
A few states, most notably Florida, North Carolina, Virginia
and New York, have recently enacted laws which either affirma-
tively protect a woman's right to breastfeed, or decriminalize
breastfeeding.3 8 Several other state legislatures have considered
such laws, including Arizona,3 9 California,4O Illinois,4 1 New
Jersey42 and Ohio.43 Pro-breastfeeding laws take three basic
forms. Such statutes may: (1) specifically exempt breastfeeding
from public nudity and other criminal statutes; (2) provide mothers
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. See, e.g., Judy Mann, Nursing Mother's Story Has Yet Another Chapter,
WASH. POST, July 9, 1980, at C1.
38. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 800.02-.04 (West 1992); N.Y. CIv. RIGHTS LAw § 79-e
(Consol. 1994); N.Y. PENAL LAw § 245.01 (Consol. 1994); N.C. GEN. STAT., § 14-190.9
(1994); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-387 (Michie 1995).
39. S. 1510, 41st Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 1994) (introduced Feb. 8, 1994).
40. Assembly 157, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1995) (introduced Jan. 18, 1995).
41. S. 190, 89th Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess., 1995 Ill. Laws 59.
42. Assembly 2009, 206th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (N.J. 1994) (introduced Mar. 29,
1993).
43. S. 342, 120th Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (Ohio 1993) (introduced Aug. 4,
1994).
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with the right to breastfeed wherever mothers and babies are other-
wise authorized to be; or (3) protect the right to breastfeed through
civil rights remedies.
Almost as important as which of these legislative approaches
a state chooses to take, however, is the choice of language and
terms employed in the statute itself. Some statutes refer to the
breastfeeding of "infantsr or "babies" rather than "children," a dis-
tinction that may be critical. Elizabeth Baldwin, legal director of
the La Leche League,44 noted that the choice to use the word "ba-
bies" in the Florida statute was a conscious one. When she asked
the then-bill's sponsor what his response to inquiries about nursing
children would be, he simply stated that children are not "cov-
ered."45 The statute, however, does not define the term "babies,"
thus it is unclear at what age a baby becomes a child.46
Another distinction among the statutes is the use of the word
"mother" rather than "women." It is not difficult to imagine scena-
rios, such as the use of a wet nurse, in which the term "mother"
might be underinclusive and restrict a statute's scope. Interest-
ingly, none of the statutes limit their scope to "discreet" or "non-
flamboyant" breastfeeding. For example, the North Carolina
statute says that a woman may breastfeed "irrespective of whether
the nipple of the mother's breast is uncovered during or incidental
to the breast feeding."47
The statute enacted in Virginia is an example of the first ap-
proach-it makes breastfeeding noncriminal. It amends the state's
criminal indecent exposure law to specifically exempt breastfeed-
ing.48 The amendment states that "[n]o person shall be deemed to
be in violation of this section for breastfeeding a child in any public
place."49 Some of the amendment's detractors argued that the
44. The La Leche League is an international non-profit advocacy group which
offers information, education and support to mothers who want to breastfeed their
babies. MASON & INGERSOLL, supra note 24, at 28.
45. Telephone Interview with Elizabeth Baldwin, La Leche League International
(Mar. 15, 1994). See also La Leche League International, Breastfeeding Rights
Packet (1986) (discussing American culture's negativism toward breastfeeding be-
yond age one) (on file with the Law and Inequality Journal).
46. Specifically, the Florida statute, which exempts breastfeeding from misde-
meanor prosecution as conduct constituting an "unnatural or lascivious act" states
simply that "a mother's breast feeding of her baby does not under any circumstances
violate this section." FLA. STAT. § 800.02 (1994) (emphasis added).
47. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-190.9 (1994). Even so, the manner in which a woman
breastfeeds seems relevant at some level. It certainly affects whether people even
notice her breastfeeding.
48. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-387 (Michie 1994). See also 1994 MICH. PuB. AcTs 313-
14 (specifically excluding breastfeeding from the definition of "public nudity" for pur-




amendment was unnecessary. First, they argued that breastfeed-
ing was not "an obscene display or exposure," and thus would not
fall under the statute.50 Second, even if breastfeeding technically
would fall within the scope of the indecent exposure statute, the
statute's application to the typical breastfeeding woman probably
would be struck down as unconstitutional.51 Although both of
these arguments may have merit, the amendment still serves the
important purpose of changing public perception and making
breastfeeding women feel more secure.
The Florida statute, enacted in February of 1993, was the first
state law providing protection for public breastfeeding. It is an ex-
ample of both the first and second types of statutes outlined
above-it affirmatively protects a mother's right to breastfeed and
also makes breastfeeding noncriminal. The bill was introduced by
a Republican legislator who had read about the harassment of a
breastfeeding mother by a mall security guard. A self-described
"traditionalist" on family values, the representative described pub-
lic breastfeeding as "a family values issue if there ever was one."52
The new law states that "[a] mother may breastfeed her baby in any
location, public or private, where the mother is otherwise author-
ized to be, irrespective of whether the nipple of the mother's breast
is covered during or incidental to the breast feeding."5s The bill
also amended the state's indecent exposure, lewd and lascivious be-
havior and obscenity statutes to exempt breastfeeding mothers.54
Similar to the Florida laws, North Carolina's pro-breastfeed-
ing statute gives women the right to breastfeed and decriminalizes
breastfeeding.5 Both the Florida and North Carolina statutes offer
potentially broad protection to breastfeeding mothers. Not only
does a woman have the right to breastfeed her baby in public, she
can do so wherever she and her baby are otherwise authorized to be.
For example, the North Carolina statute provides that "a woman
may breast feed in any public or private location where she is other-
wise authorized to be, irrespective of whether the nipple of the
50. But see Pallot, supra note 19, at 6 (discussing how some women find
breastfeeding "embarrassing, unnecessary," or "disgusting").
51. Constitutional protection of the right to breastfeed was announced in Dike v.
School Board, 650 F.2d 783 (5th Cir. 1981). The Dike case, discussed in detail in
Part III.A, may prevent the application of indecent exposure laws to breastfeeding
women.
52. Larry Rohter, Florida Approves Measure on Right to Breast-Feed in Public,
N.Y. TImsS, Mar. 4, 1993, at A18.
53. FLA. STAT. § 383.015(1) (1994) (originally introduced as H. B. 231 (Fla. 1993),
amending FLA. STAT. §§ 383.015, 800.02, 800.03, 800.04, 847.001).
54. See FLA. STAT. §§ 800.02-.04, 847.001 (1994).
55. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-190.9b (1994).
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mother's breast is uncovered.. ."56 Thus, a woman presumably can
breastfeed in a variety of quasi-public places, such as restaurants,
food courts, and even museums. The Florida and North Carolina
statutes, however, probably would not protect the woman who
wishes to breastfeed or breastpump at work. First, the statutes are
silent about work and breastpumping. Second, and more impor-
tantly, babies generally are not allowed to be at work with their
mothers.
The statute enacted in New York is an example of the third
approach mentioned above. 57 As an addition to the state's civil
rights law, it protects a woman's right to breastfeed wherever she
and her baby are otherwise authorized to be. Most importantly, it
provides a remedy. The remedy can be enforced through the Attor-
ney General, the Division of Human Rights, or a private civil suit.5 8
The availability of a remedy is important in deterring much of the
informal harassment surrounding breastfeeding. Under the New
York law, the breastfeeding woman who is asked to leave a restau-
rant can say more than just, "I have a right to breastfeed here, you
know." Indeed she can threaten or even bring suit. In contrast, the
Florida and North Carolina statutes offer breastfeeding women no
legal recourse against those who discriminate against them, despite
the fact that breastfeeding is "protected."
As with the other statutes, however, the New York statute
probably does not apply to breastfeeding or pumping at a private
workplace. The legislative history of the act suggests that the legis-
lature was primarily concerned about breastfeeding in public or
quasi-public (e.g., malls) places.59 In order for the law to apply to
private employers, a clear legislative intent would have to be found.
Even so, the New York law may have some significance for public
employees, in spirit if not in actual application. The preamble to
the law states the legislature's clear intent to encourage breastfeed-
ing and prevent interference with it. It "declares that the breast
feeding of a baby is an important and basic act of nature which
must be encouraged in the interests of maternal and child health
56. Id.
57. N.Y. CIv. RIGHTs LAw § 79-e (Consol. 1994). The law states, "Notwithstand-
ing any other provision of law, a mother may breast feed her baby in any location,
public or private, where the mother is authorized to be, irrespective of whether or
not the nipple of the mother's breast is covered during or incidental to the
breastfeeding." Id.
58. See Open Breast-Feeding Becomes Legal Right, N.Y. TIuEs, May 19, 1994, at
B4, and Correction of May 23, 1994, at A2 (stating that the law gives women the
right to file civil suits or to ask the Attorney General or the Division of Human
Rights to bring suit on her behalf).
59. See N.Y. Crv. RIGHTS LAw § 79-e (Consol. 1994) (Legislative Findings).
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and family values."60 Thus, a breastfeeding public employee argu-
ing for a right to breastfeed at work could point to this strong state-
ment of intent by the legislature.
B. State Antidiscrimination Laws
Although most states have not yet enacted legislation which
affirmatively protects breastfeeding, women in these states are not
without recourse under state law. Widely promulgated antidis-
crimination statutes provide a basis for asserting a violation of a
woman's civil rights stemming from discrimination against
breastfeeding. The case of Eaton v. Iowa City6l illustrates both the
possibilities and pitfalls inherent in state antidiscrimination laws.
Linda Eaton's fight to breastfeed her son received widespread
attention. Eaton was a firefighter with the Iowa City Fire Depart-
ment-an obviously male-dominated workplace. She requested
permission to bring her son into the station twice a day so that she
could breastfeed him in the women's locker room during her free
time. The city denied her request, citing an unwritten fire depart-
ment policy banning regularly scheduled family visits.62 Even so,
Eaton breastfed her baby at the station. When she was again sus-
pended for violating fire department policy Eaton filed a civil rights
suit against the city and obtained a temporary restraining order
which allowed her to breastfeed until her suit was decided.63
Eaton's civil rights suit claimed that the City's actions violated
her civil right to privacy, as protected under a state statute. Like
Dike, Eaton relied on Griswold v. Connecticut64 and Prince v. Mas-
sachusetts,65 which established a constitutional right to marital
privacy and a right to guide and direct one's children, respectively.
The Iowa Civil Rights Commission unanimously ruled that the City
discriminated against Eaton and awarded her compensatory pay-
ment, back pay and attorneys' fees. The Commission rejected the
City's argument that the City should not have "'to make whatever
accommodations an employee would feel necessary' for breastfeed-
ing."66 The Commission also found the City's claim of "business ne-
cessity" to be without merit. For example, although the City
60. S. 39999-A, Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1994).
61. Equity No. 44570 (Iowa Dist. Ct., Johnson County, dismissed Oct. 3, 1980).
62. MASON & INGERSOLL, supra note 24, at 180-81. Apparently, the station had
an unwritten rule forbidding "visitors on the premises during a firefighter's duty
shift." Id.
63. Id. at 181.
64. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
65. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
66. Jamie Gold, Against Motherhood?, WASH. POST, Aug. 8, 1979, at E2.
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claimed Eaton would be unable to respond to fires quickly enough,
the first time the alarm rang while she was breastfeeding her son,
Eaton was the second one on the truck.67 The combination of the
injunction, the time it took the Commission to hear her claim, and
the Commission's favorable ruling allowed Eaton to breastfeed her
son at the firehouse until he was seven months old.
Eaton's strategy, however, was not without costs. Although
the state Civil Rights Commission was sympathetic to her claims,
her co-workers and the city were not. After the breastfeeding litiga-
tion ended, Eaton brought suit against the City alleging sexual har-
assment and discrimination. In retaliation for her breastfeeding
suit, she claimed someone cut off the middle fingers of her protec-
tive gloves, poured salt into her orange juice, and blackened out her
picture.68 Due to the continued harassment and the city's refusal to
take action,6 9 Eaton resigned from the fire department. Years
later, when Eaton's harassment suit was finally decided, the jury
found against Eaton, concluding that the pranks had been mere
"firehouse horseplay."7o
M. Federal Theories for a Right to Breastfeed
Clearly, state laws alone do not adequately protect breastfeed-
ing women. As the several instances described in Parts I and II
exemplify, breastfeeding women face various forms of discrimina-
tion, particularly in the workplace. Potential criminal prosecution
for breastfeeding is merely one of the many hurdles that breastfeed-
ing women face. In order to truly establish and guarantee a wo-
man's right to breastfeed in public and elsewhere, legal theories
supporting such a right must be developed and asserted by and for
women who have suffered this form of harassment and discrimina-
tion. Theories based upon the Fourteenth Amendment and Title
VII, as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, are dis-
cussed below.
67. Joseph McLellan, The High Cost of Lunch at the Firehouse: Linda Eaton's
Fight to Nurse on the Job, WASH. POST, May 18, 1979, at C1.
68. MASON & INGERSOLL, supra note 24, at 182.
69. Id.
70. See Firefighter's Bias Suit in Iowa Goes to a Jury, N.Y. TIsMs, Feb. 2, 1984,
at D22; Chief Denies Iowa Firemen Were Sexist, N.Y. TMES, Jan. 25, 1984, at C8.
See also Ex-Firefighter Loses Her Bias Suit in Iowa, N.Y. TnMEs, Feb. 3, 1984, at A8.
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A. Dike v. School Board: The Fourteenth Amendment
The Due Process Clause7l provides the strongest argument for
a right to breastfeed. In the most significant breastfeeding rights
case thus far, Dike v. School Board,72 the Fifth Circuit held that a
public school teacher had a constitutionally protected interest in
breastfeeding her child, finding that a woman's right to breastfeed
stems from the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments. 73
In this case, school teacher Janice Dike nursed her baby dur-
ing her lunch break for three months before she was told to stop. At
that time, the principal and the school board told her that a school
policy prohibited teachers from bringing their children to work.
Dike stopped nursing her baby temporarily but had to start again
because the baby developed an allergy to formula and refused the
bottle, even if it contained expressed breastmilk. Because the
Board still refused to let her breastfeed, Dike was compelled to take
an unpaid leave of absence. 74
Dike brought suit against the board, alleging interference
with her fundamental right to nurture her child through
breastfeeding. She argued that the right to breastfeed is entitled to
constitutional protection as part of a larger right to parent. Thus,
she relied on cases such as Wisconsin v. Yoder,75 Prince v. Massa-
chusetts,76 and Pierce v. Society of Sisters 77 which held that parents
have a fundamental right to direct the upbringing of their children.
71. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. However, the Equal Protection Clause may
provide alternative support for a right to breastfeed. Feminist theorists have made
similar proposals in contexts such as pregnancy. See, e.g., Sylvia Law, Rethinking
Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. Rxv. 955 (1984) (arguing that biological
difference should be the focal point of equal protection analysis in gender cases).
Although courts have noi interpreted the clause to protect public breastfeeding, the
theory may be tenable. Breastfeeding, like pregnancy, imposes special burdens on
women. Only women can breastfeed. Thus, policies which prohibit or otherwise in-
fringe upon breastfeeding exclusively disadvantage women. It seems obvious that
discrimination against breastfeeding is discrimination against women. But see
Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (holding that a public health insurance
scheme that excluded pregnancy benefits did not impermissibly discriminate on the
basis of sex); see also supra notes 112 and 113 and accompanying text (discussing
Geduldig).
72. 650 F.2d 783 (5th Cir. 1981).
73. The court noted, however, that a mother's interest in breastfeeeding her
child must be weighed against the interests of the school. Id. at 785.
74. MASON & INGERSOLL, supra note 24, at 177.
75. 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (holding that a state law requiring school attendance
until age 16 violated both the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of Amish
parents who urged that school conflicted with their ability to raise their children
according to their values).
76. 321 U.S. 158, reh'g denied, 321 U.S. 804 (1944). In Prince, the Court recog-
nized that the primary care of children resides with their parents or guardians, but
that parental rights may be subject to limitations by the state. Id. at 166.
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Dike also cited such cases as Griswold v. Connecticut78 and Roe v.
Wade,79 which held that a fundamental right to privacy applied to
both contraception and abortion, respectively. In sum, Dike argued
that breastfeeding fell within the penumbra of constitutional
rights,80 which cannot be interfered with absent a compelling state
interest.
The district court dismissed Dike's complaint as "frivolous"
and awarded attorneys' fees to the school board.81 On appeal, the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded deeming
breastfeeding "the most elemental form of parental care."8 2 Citing
Griswold, the court compared breastfeeding to marriage, calling
both "intimate to the degree of being sacred."83 The court also re-
lied on the cases mentioned above involving the constitutional right
to guide one's children. Interestingly, the court also cited cases
which fell under the rubric of equal protection, such as Zablocki
v. Redhail84 and Skinner v. Oklahoma.85 Emphasizing that
breastfeeding is an issue of choice, the court recognized that a "par-
ent may choose to believe that breastfeeding will enhance the
child's psychological as well as physical health."86
But the fact that the court found breastfeeding to be a pro-
tected liberty interest was, as the court said, only the beginning of
the constitutional inquiry.8 7 The board's "no teachers' children at
school" policy would be permissible if it "furthered sufficiently im-
portant state interests and was closely tailored to effectuate only
those interests."88 It is unclear, however, how "important" the
state's interest must be. The court gave examples of the school
board's possible interests, such as "avoiding disruption of the edu-
77. 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (striking down state statute requiring public school at-
tendance as an interference with parental rights in directing their children's
upbringing).
78. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
79. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
80. See, e.g., Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485 (1965) (holding that a married couple's
access to contraception is constitutionally protected by the penumbra of the "specific
guarantees of the Bill of Rights").
81. Dike, 650 F.2d at 784.
82. Id. at 787.
83. Id. (citing Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486).
84. 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (requiring strict scrutiny analysis of state law that pre-
vented persons violating child support orders from remarrying).
85. 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (finding statute that required sterilization of habitual
criminals but exempted certain crimes to be a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause).





cational process, ensuring that teachers perform their duties with-
out distraction, and avoiding potential liability for accidents."89
On remand, the district court ruled in favor of the school
board, holding that the board had a compelling interest in restrict-
ing teachers' children from school property that could only be
achieved through a "no teachers' children at school" policy. The
court discussed the board's need for teachers' loyalty and undivided
attention as well as legitimate liability concerns. It is difficult to
believe that the board's interests are truly "compelling" or the least
restrictive alternative. Rather, it seems the circuit court's ambigu-
ous language combined with the district court's view of breastfeed-
ing as trivial9o led to more of a "balancing test" than a "strict
scrutiny" analysis. That is, the district court weighed the interests
of the school district versus those of Dike, giving no more weight to
the latter.
Before the case could be appealed, the parties settled out of
court.9 1 Dike received back pay and was reinstated. Perhaps the
board's settlement proposal indicated its uncertainty that the dis-
trict court's holding would be upheld on appeal. The unfavorable
holding of the district court combined with subsequent settlement,
however, leave many questions unanswered. Certainly Dike is an
important precedent for women in the public 92 and employment
contexts. Beyond that, the scope of the right to breastfeed, when
applied to individual cases, is somewhat uncertain. Although sev-
eral cases have discussed Dike, none have significantly clarified the
scope of a woman's right to breastfeed. 93 A court easily could ma-
nipulate the concept of a "compelling" state interest to justify cer-
tain restrictions on the manner in which a woman breastfeeds. For
example, a state might argue that it has a compelling interest in
protecting people's sensibilities against a woman who breastfeeds
in a flamboyant and exposing manner.
Because Dike leaves many questions unanswered, a woman
arguing for a due process right to breastfeed should not rely on it
89. Id.
90. The same district court judge heard the case originally and on remand.
91. MASON & INGERSOLL, supra note 24, at 179.
92. In the public context, for example, the existence of a fundamental right to
breastfeed suggests that the application of an indecent exposure law to a breastfeed-
ing mother would be unconstitutional.
93. See Barrash v. Bowen, 846 F.2d 927 (4th Cir. 1988) (holding that public em-
ployee's constitutional right to breastfeed does not entitle employee to six months of
maternity leave); Southerland v. Thigpen, 784 F.2d 713 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding that
incarcerated mother had no fundamental interest in breastfeeding which would
override the state's competing interests); Berrios-Berrios v. Thornburg, 716 F. Supp.
987 (E.D. Ky. 1989) (holding that inmate had fundamental right to breastfeed her
baby during regular visits but no right to express and store breastmilk).
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alone. Rather, she should emphasize the fundamental rights lan-
guage of Dike, using both the parental prerogative and individual
privacy rationales.94 She should also point out the high threshold
that a state faces in justifying an intrusion on a fundamental right.
Specifically, a state must demonstrate a compelling, not simply sub-
stantial, state interest as well as show that no less restrictive alter-
native exists.9 5 Cases such as Griswold v. Connecticut,96 Roe v.
Wade,97 and Zablocki v. Redhail98 are helpful here.99 In addition,
a woman should discuss in detail exactly why breastfeeding is im-
portant. A woman should express the sincerity of her belief that
breastfeeding is best for her child. She should emphasize that, to
her, breastfeeding is an integral part of parenting. Indeed, she
should point out that studies show that breastfeeding is beneficial
for a child.100 She must overcome the view that breastfeeding is
trivial and persuade the court that breastfeeding is an important
and personal childrearing decision.
Due process protection for breastfeeding, though, has several
inherent limitations. First, the Due Process Clause only protects
individual liberties from state interference.O1 Private employers
and owners of private property, or even quasi-public property, are
not affected. Thus, the woman who is prevented from breastfeeding
or breastpumping in a nongovernment workplace must find legal
protection elsewhere.102
Second, due process protection is merely protection from state
interference. Under this rationale, the state may not unduly inter-
fere with a woman's right to breastfeed, but it is not required to
accommodate breastfeeding. In the context of birth control and
abortion rights, this distinction surfaces with respect to public
funding.10 3 That is, Congress may refuse to fund abortion even
though the right to seek abortion exists. In the breastfeeding con-
text, the "no interference versus accommodation" debate plays out
94. Dike, 650 F.2d at 787.
95. See id. (explaining test for justifying impinging on a fundamental right).
96. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
97. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
98. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
99. See supra text accompanying notes 75-85 (discussing relevance of cases).
100. Actually, a woman should not have to show that breastfeeding is better for a
child, only that it is not harmful. Even so, Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972),
suggests that the court's view of the "wholesomeness" of the parent's wishes goes a
long way.
101. See, e.g., The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (holding that the Civil
Rights Act cannot constitutionally be imposed on individual actions).
102. Indeed, as discussed earlier, it is unlikely that any state laws would protect a
breastfeeding mother's interests vis-a-vis her private employer. See supra part II-A.
103. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
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in the workplace. A public employer probably does not have to offer
a breastfeeding woman extended leave, flexible breaks or a place to
pump breastmilk.104 For example, in rejecting a working woman's
claim of a right to breastfeed, the court in Barrash v. Bowen stated:
"She may have a constitutional right to nurse her baby for six
months . . . but the plaintiff here asserts no right to be let alone
while she cares for her baby in the manner she thinks best. Her
claim is one of entitlement.. ."105 Other courts, also, might distin-
guish the right to breastfeed from accommodation of breastfeeding,
especially in a situation requiring significant accommodation.
B. Title VII and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act
Title VII06 offers some protection for women from sex dis-
crimination.' 0 7 Generally speaking, it extends equal protection
analysis to the employment context and provides a remedy to em-
ployees harmed by illegal discrimination. Title VII forbids employ-
ment discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin, by employers of fifteen or more employees, includ-
ing state and local governments, educational institutions and, most
importantly, private employers. 1os Notably, Title VII was amended
in 1978 to include employment protection for pregnancy and preg-
nancy-related conditions; this amendment is commonly referred to
as the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA).109
Typically, Title VII lawsuits are brought by plaintiffs under
the disparate treatment or disparate impact theories. Under both
theories, the plaintiff must show that an unfair hiring or employ-
ment practice exists. These theories are problematic in the context
of breastfeeding because breastfeeding women often seek additional
104. Notably, a public employer may have to "accommodate" breastfeeding women
to the same extent that it accommodates other similarly-situated persons. See supra
part II.
105. 846 F.2d at 932 (holding that even if employee has right to breastfeed, such
right does not entitle her to discretionary leave in order to enable her to breastfeed).
106. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994).
107. The Act provides that:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or other-
wise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his com-
pensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because
of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely af-
fect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2003-2(a) (1994).
108. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (b) (1994).
109. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (k) (1994).
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accommodation, not a level playing field with other non-breastfeed-
ing workers,110 and many employers do not have general practices
in place that breastfeeding women could claim should be extended
to them. Examples of such practices that might be discriminatory
are family visiting policies that exclude infants, or leave policies for
family emergencies but not for more routine matters like
breastfeeding. Thus, neither the disparate treatment nor the dis-
parate impact theory is a cure-all for employed breastfeeding wo-
men. However, both theories offer potential relief for women who
can point to specific discriminatory hiring or employment practices.
Breastfeeding women who make claims under Title VII will
most likely do so under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act. Con-
gress passed the Act in response to two Supreme Court decisions
which held that discrimination on the basis of pregnancy did not
constitute sex discrimination."'' In the first of these cases,
Geduldig v. Aiello,112 the Supreme Court held that a state law,
which excluded from disability benefits a temporary disability aris-
ing from a normal pregnancy, did not violate the Equal Protection
Clause.i13 The next similar case to reach the Court was General
Electric Co. v. Gilbert.ii4 In this case, the Court held that an em-
ployer's disability plan that covered all disabilities except those as-
sociated with or arising out of pregnancy was not in violation of
Title VII.ii5 A year after Gilbert, in Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, i i
6
the Court considered an employer's policy of requiring that preg-
nant women take a leave of absence during pregnancy without disa-
110. In some cases, breastfeeding mothers might seek a level playing field with
non-breastfeeding workers.
111. General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S.
484 (1974).
112. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
113. To reach this conclusion, the Court compared women on the aggregate to
men on the aggregate, and said that there was no evidence that the plan "worked to
discriminate against any definable group or class in terms of the aggregate risk pro-
tection derived by that group or class from the program." 417 U.S. at 496. The
Court stated, "There is no risk from which men are protected and women are not.
Likewise, there is no risk from which women are protected and men are not." Id. at
496-97.
114. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
115. In Gilbert, the Supreme Court made the same aggregate comparison of wo-
men to men as it had in Geduldig, and reached the same result. The Court stated:
As there is no proof that the package is in fact worth more to men than
to women, it is impossible to find any gender-based discriminatory ef-
fect in this scheme simply because women disabled as a result of preg-
nancy do not receive benefits; that is to say, gender-based
discrimination does not result simply because an employers disability
benefits plan is less than all-inclusive.
429 U.S. at 138-39.
116. 434 U.S. 136 (1977).
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bility benefits, and which stripped them of their seniority upon
their return to work. The court held the absence of disability bene-
fits to be in conformity with Title VII, but found that stripping re-
turning women of their seniority violated Title VII.1 17
Despite the fact that the Court had moved slightly closer to
finding that at least some forms of pregnancy discrimination consti-
tuted sex discrimination in Satty, Congress acted to make this con-
nection by passing the Pregnancy Discrimination Act. The Act
provides:
The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include, but
are not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy,
childbirth, or related medical conditions; and women affected
by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be
treated the same for all employment-related purposes, includ-
ing receipt of benefits under fringe benefit programs, as other
persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to
work, and nothing in... this title shall be interpreted to permit
otherwise. 118
Because of the passage of the PDA, employers may no longer main-
tain policies that negatively impact pregnant women relative to
other employees, unless the employer can establish a defense of
business necessity or show that the policy was part of a bona fide
occupational qualification (BFOQ).
The PDA establishes that pregnancy discrimination consti-
tutes sex discrimination; thus, the inquiry for breastfeeding plain-
tiffs is whether breastfeeding, as a natural extension of pregnancy,
is protected as either a "related medical condition," or because the
breastfeeding woman is "affected by pregnancy." No case has di-
rectly determined whether the PDA protects breastfeeding. How-
ever, the closest case on point suggests that it might not. In Board
of School Directors v. Rossetti ,119 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
rejected a public teacher's claim that the school board's refusal to
grant her a discretionary extended leave to breastfeed her baby con-
stituted sex discrimination. The state civil rights law12 0 under
which the claim was heard essentially mimicked the PDA. The
117. Id. at 139-42. The Court stated:
We held in Gilbert that § 703(a)(1) did not require that greater eco-
nomic benefits be paid to one sex or the other "because of their differing
roles in 'the scheme of human existence,'". .. But that holding does not
allow us to read § 703(a)(2) to permit an employer to burden female
employees in such a way as to deprive them of employment opportuni-
ties because of their significant role.
Id. at 142 (citations omitted).
118. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (k) (1994).
119. 411 A.2d 486 (Pa. 1979).
120. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 955(a) (Supp. 1995). The Act has been interpreted
as proscribing pregnancy-based discrimination as sex discrimination.
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court held that breastfeeding is not protected as a condition of preg-
nancy. The court stated that the female teacher who wanted leave
to breastfeed was treated the same as male teachers who requested
leave to stay home with an infant. The court saw equality in the
fact that teachers of both sexes were given discretionary leave. No-
tably, Rossetti's holding is not binding with regard to a federal
court's interpretation of the PDA and it is possible other courts will
not follow it. 121
One could argue that, contrary to the court's holding in Ros-
setti, discrimination against breastfeeding is sex discrimination. As
the lower court in Rossetti pointed out, "leave for breastfeeding pur-
poses under the circumstances of this case is merely a logical and
natural extension of [the] concept" that pregnancy discrimination is
sex discrimination.122 In the strict physical sense, it is unclear how
pregnancy and breastfeeding are different. Both are quasi-volun-
tary conditions.123 Both are exclusively linked to women's bodies.
Like pregnancy, breastfeeding is exclusively women's burden and
benefit. In fact, distinguishing discrimination against breastfeed-
ing from that against pregnancy may be splitting hairs-for many
women breastfeeding is a natural extension of pregnancy.
If the PDA applies to breastfeeding as a "related medical con-
dition," the implications are broad. A breastfeeding employee who
demonstrates that her employer discriminated against breastfeed-
ing would be entitled to relief under the PDA. In particular, a
breastfeeding or breastpumping woman could bring suit under
either a disparate treatment 124 or disparate impact theory.125
Without exploring in detail the elements of disparate treat-
ment and disparate impact claims, it is useful to describe some situ-
ations in which breastfeeding women might make these claims.
Breastfeeding plaintiffs could make a claim of systemic disparate
treatment by pointing to the existence of an announced, formal pol-
121. An unpublished decision of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, on a claim
similar to Rosetti's, was rejected on similar grounds. Wallace v. Pyro Mining Co., 951
F.2d 351 (6th Cir. 1991).
122. Board of Sch. Directors v. Rossetti, 387 A.2d 957, 960 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1978).
123. I say "quasi-voluntary" because pregnancy arguably is not a "choice" for the
woman who becomes pregnant involuntarily (i.e., is raped) and is unable to obtain or
chooses not to have an abortion. Similarly, breastfeeding may not be a "choice" for
the woman who, after becoming pregnant involuntarily, feels obligated to breastfeed
her baby.
124. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989); McDonnell-
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
125. See, e.g., Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 141-43 (1977) (discussing
disparate impact analysis in pregnancy discrimination case); Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (holding that Title VII prohibits neutral employment prac-
tices which have a discriminatory impact, absent a showing of business necessity).
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icy of discrimination. Thus, a breastfeeding employee would have
to show that her employer treated breastfeeding or breastpumping
employees differently than similarly situated employees. A
breastfeeding employee might challenge an employer policy which
disallows breastfeeding or breastpumping at work but allows prac-
tices with a similar impact on the employee's work relationship.
For example, a breastfeeding woman might challenge an employer
policy that allows a company lounge to be used for diabetic employ-
ees who require insulin injections and rest, but does not allow the
lounge to be used for breastfeeding and breastpumping employees.
Similarly, a breastfeeding employee might challenge an employer
policy which only allowed leave for medical and disability purposes.
Such practices probably would constitute sex discrimination under
Title VII unless the employer could offer an adequate defense.126
A second Title VII theory, disparate impact, applies to employ-
ment practices that "are fair in form, but discriminatory in opera-
tion."127 Thus, unlike disparate treatment analysis, in which the
employee must show intentional discrimination, disparate impact
analysis requires only a showing of discriminatory impact. 128 Even
so, a disparate impact argument imposes a high burden of proof on
the plaintiff and is difficult to satisfy. First, a plaintiff employee
must show a statistically significant impact on female employees as
a result of an employer practice.12 9 For example, a breastfeeding
employee may argue that an employer's refusal to allow half-hour
breaks for any purpose has a disparate impact on women: women
as a group, because of some women's need to breastfeed and
breastpump, are disadvantaged by such a policy. Second, the em-
ployer must defend the employment practice by showing a business
necessity for it. Because "business necessity" is a somewhat broad
defense,1ao in many situations employers could argue effectively
that accommodating breastfeeding employees is too costly or dis-
ruptive. Thus, a disparate impact case would probably be difficult
to win.
A pro-pregnancy Supreme Court case offers a glimmer of hope
for breastfeeding mothers. In California Federal Savings & Loan
Ass'n v. Guerra,lal the Court considered whether a California stat-
126. An employer defense of "business necessity" would most likely be successful
in a situation where the woman wants to breastfeed her baby at work, rather than
breastpump. Under such circumstances, the employer could argue that the
breastfeeding disrupts the workplace.
127. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
128. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
129. See EEOC Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4D (1995).
130. See, e.g., Ward's Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
131. 479 U.S. 272 (1987).
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ute that required certain employers to provide female employees an
unpaid pregnancy disability leave of up to four months was pre-
empted by Title VII and the PDA. The Court held that the federal
statute did not preempt the state law, because the Court found
"that Congress intended the PDA to be 'a floor beneath which preg-
nancy disability benefits may not drop-not a ceiling above which
they may not rise.'"132 Thus, added benefits provided to pregnant
women that were not provided to non-pregnant persons were held
consistent with the PDA. If this case were extended to breastfeed-
ing, and an employer provided breastfeeding women with certain
benefits (like additional break time, or extended leave), such a ben-
efit would not be found to violate Title VII.
Thus, Title VII could provide a legal basis for breastfeeding
plaintiffs to challenge discriminatory hiring or employment prac-
tices. The PDA would offer protection to breastfeeding women if the
link between pregnancy and breastfeeding-both conditions unique
to women-were made. No court has yet made this connection, and
the paucity of decisions in this area makes it difficult to predict
whether such claims would be successful. Yet because breastfeed-
ing is a condition unique to women, use of Title VII is problematic
because the statute requires comparison of similarly-situated
groups. With regard to both pregnancy and breastfeeding, such
comparisons are difficult, if not impossible, to make. Nonetheless,
if breastfeeding were accorded the same status as pregnancy under
Title VII, this employment statute could be a useful tool for some
breastfeeding women.
Conclusion
Discrimination against breastfeeding in public and at work is
widespread. It acts as a barrier to women who would otherwise
choose to breastfeed at work but are effectively prevented from do-
ing so. Given that breastfeeding is widely acknowledged as benefi-
cial for both babies and their mothers, it is disturbing that the
facilitation of this important process meets so much misunder-
standing and resistance. Although some states have taken steps by
enacting laws which affirmatively protect breastfeeding, or at least
exempt it from criminal prosecution, more complete protection is
needed. Most current state laws are limited in their reach and fail
to provide legal remedies. Thus, other sources of legal protection
for breastfeeding must be considered.
132. 479 U.S. at 285 (quoting California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 758
F.2d 390, 396 (9th Cir. 1985)).
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While several theories under federal and constitutional law
are generally promising, women working in the private sector, as
well as women who breastfeed in quasi-public places such as res-
taurants, remain the least protected. The uncertain scope of a fed-
erally recognized right to breastfeed and the current approach that
requires only that the government not interfere with a woman's
right to breastfeed leave women vulnerable. Without better accom-
modation of breastfeeding and breastpumping in the workplace, the
abstract right to breastfeed is of little value. Thus, future legisla-
tive action should require "reasonable accommodation" of
breastfeeding and provide for civil penalties for interference with a
woman who is lawfully breastfeeding. Until the legislatures and
courts send clear messages about the right to breastfeed and what
it entails, women will be discouraged from breastfeeding in public
and at work. As a result, both women and their children will suffer.
